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In September 1934, Dr. Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht,
President of the Reichsbank and Minister of Finance under Adolpli Hitler,
brought into operation his New Plan for Germany *s foreign trade. The
New Plan centralized trade into 25 supervisory centers which would allo-
cate the available foreign exchange for sanctioned import transactions.
Trade agreements were concluded with a number of countries — especially
in Central Europe and South America — where German purchases abroad were
credited for offset purchases in the German markets. By Spring of 1938
"such offset account agreements operated in no fewer than twenty-five
countries, so that more than half Germany's foreign trade was carried on
through these channels." (26. pp. 302-3).
Hailed by Schacht and many German writers as a significL.it inno-
vation and advance in the conduct of foreign trade, the New Plan has been
described only in varying degrees of opprobrium by economic historians.
i
Bluntest is the assessment by Gustav Stolper (27 , p. 143).
Schacht* s New Plan cut Hitler's economy loose from
International customs and manners. For decades the
expression "schachtlanism" was used in the English-
speaking world to characterize a policy of tricks,
discrimination, end the ruthless pursuit of egotisti-
cal aims in world trade. The traditional methods of
world trade.. ..were now replaced in German trade
policy by bilateral arrangements.
Why should bilateral agreements be identified with "tricks, discrimination,
and the ruthless pursuit of egotistical aims" at least any more so than
the "traditional methods of world trade"? The major reason appears to be
the relative size of the economies of Germany and her clearing agreement
partners. The Importance of the German market to the exporters in Central

Europe and Latin America, and the eventual importance of German imports
to the economies of these countries meant that Germany had an apparent
bargaining advantage in the negotiations setting up the terms cl each
clearing, or barter, agreement.* However, there are historical difficulties
with this line of argument. Germany began its negotiations at a relative
disadvantage compared with the previous great trading partner i of these
countries — the United States, Great Britain, or France. Condemnation
of Schacht and his methods is unfair if not balanced by similar condemna-
tion of the other large trading nations for not constraining the bargaining
ploys of Schacht to their advantage and the advantage of the i nail trading
nations. There are difficulties with the economic aspects of the argument
as well. The economic advantages which can in theory be gained by a
superior bargaining position in bilateral exchange were in fact rever rea-
lized by Germany.
A rein^erpretation of Schacht 1 s New Plan appears to be needed.
The interpretation offered here will be that the clearing agiaements
conferred political rather than economic advantages upon Gcrr snyj and that
Germany purchased these political advantagesby conferring the larger part
of the gains of trade upon her trading partners. The key to the success
of ttu.se agreements — political for Germany, economic for her trading
partner — was the role played by the central banks in each cou try. In
sum, there existed a trade-off between the political goals and the econom-
ic advantages which were possible from either side. To finance the ex-
change of political Influence for economic advantage, novel uses were
made of the new central banks created after World War I — uses which
spawned techniques a till in use today in international finance.

I. The Economics of the New Plan
If economic advantage were the German goal in negotiations of
clearing agreements with smaller countries, there were basically only
two ways they could be accomplished: 1) the exercise of monopsony power
by forcing the small trading partner to accept lower than competitive
prices on its products Imported by Germany, or 2) using monopoly power to
force the small country to pay higher than competitive prices on the
German exports it purchased. The first technique appears to be what one
textbook suggests was used when it states, "as Germany soon discovered,
a lack of balance in its trade with other exchange control countries pro-
vided a means whereby it could take advantage of its buyer's position to
exploit countries largely dependent on Germany for their export market."
(13, P* 2*3).
The difficulty with this suggestion is that the prices offered
by Germany to its trading partners for its Imported commodities were con-
sistently above the world price and the Internal price within the partner
country. The foreign foodstuffs it purchased from Southeastern European
countries were bought at prices from 20 to 40 percent above the world mar-
ket price (11
. p. 157). Basch cites the case of Germany paying prices
for Roumania's soybeans that were several times those charged overseas
(2, p. 218). Further, Germany on average paid more for the same commodity
when it was imported from a clearing agreement country than when it was
imported from a non-clearing country. It may be argued, of course, with
Guillebaud (11
. p. 151) that these high prices were merely for the sake of
entrapment, and that renewal of the clearing agreements would bring a

4substantial reduction in these prices. Indeed, it is true that German
officials were dissatisfied with the exchange rate of the nark in ex-
change markets and attempted to improve it in order to lower the cost of
imports while attempting to revise clearing agreements on more favorable
terms. This was not accomplished with any success, however, until 1942
after Germany had absorbed nearly all of Central Europe into the Third
Reich (2, P. 219).
Granting the failure of Germany to act in a manner befitting a
monopsonist, the argument can still be made that the high prices it paid
for imports were not high compared to German domestic prices while the
prices of German exports were high compared to world prices. This is to
say that if Germany did not exploit its relative size by exercising
power as a monopsonist, this was done to enable it to exercise power as a
monopolist on the export side. Guillebaud, in fact makes this argument
asserting that "in large compensation transactions, Germany is often able
to secure a price for her exports which is well above the ordinary com-
petitive price" (11 , p. 158, fn. 2). "Since Germany maintained an
overvalued mark throughout the period of exchange control! the exercise
of monopoly power on the pricing of exports was necessary to avoid either
a deficit on trade account or a significant reduction In the volume of
trade,"
This argument is explicitly rejected by Howard Ellis who
examinee in particular the German export drive after 1934 to the southeast.
His description of the prototype case of Yugoslavia is especially revealing.

In order to give the German buying drive momentum,
German export goods had b< jn offered at low prices
during the first year or two. But when German pur-
chases had raised even the level of domestic prices
in Yugoslavia, and when the limit of full employ-
ment began to be felt in Germany, the prices of ex-
port goods began to rise, not only overtly but also
covertly in the deterioration of quality and in
long delays in delivery. To offset these effectB
,
(my italics) German purchasing agencies offered to
sell at incredibly generous "terms" with almost
negligible down payments (10, p. 264).
The rise in German export prices after a year or two was not due to the
practice of monopoly pricing by German trade authorities, but aue to the
effects of inflation on the general price levels in Germany and Yugoslavia.
Instead of exploiting this situation to German advantage, German authori-
ties tried their best to offset these forces towards higher prices, pur-
posefully avoiding the gains possible from monopoly pricing. The
Yugoslavia example helps explain why the terms of trade continued to move
against Germany throughout the operation of the New Plan from 1934 to 1938.
From 1935 to 1936 import prices rose by 3.8 percent while export prices
fell by 2.9 percent. From 1936 to 1937 import prices rose by 10.2 percent
while export prices only rose 3.6 percent (11 , p. 100, 149). The situation
became even worse when the war broke out. Ellis comments that "the monop-
sonistic position which Germany had created for herself by clever exploit-
ation of clearing agreements led to her having a monopoly in significant
segments of her partner's market." (10 , p. 264). But it appears that
Germany made a considerable investment over a number of years to achieve
a monopoly position she never utilized.
Ellis' argument is that Germany willingly paid higher than

competitive prices for imports from clearing agreement partners and sold
her exports at less than competitive prices to establish a growing
political power "which could scarcely fail to menace the economic status
of Southeastern Europe generally ( 10 , p. 265). Table I below shows the
percentage share of both imports and exports which Germany enjoyed in
Southeastern Europe both before and after the New Flan.
Table I. Germany's Percentage Share in the Trade of Southeastern Europe
(I - imports, E exports)
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937
I E I E I E I E I E I E I E I E I E
Bulgaria 22 30 23 36 23 30 26 26 38 36 41 43 54 48 61 48 55 43
Greece 9 23 10 23 12 14 10 15 10 18 15 23 19 30 22 36 27 31
Hungary 20 12 21 10 24 13 22 15 20 11 18 22 23 24 26 23 26 24
Yugoslavia 16 9 18 12 19 11 18 11 13 14 14 15 16 19 27 24 32 22
Roumania 24 28 25 19 29 11 24 12 19 11 16 17 24 17 36 18 29 19
Source: Le<ague 01f Natioiis , In t<srnatioilal Tra<ie Stat istics [Geneva
,
1938)
It is clear that Germany did increase her share ot the trade in Southeastern
Europe but it is also clear that her trade was already substantial before
the Depression. Indeed, since Germany had carried on a substantial part of
her foreign trade with eastern and southeastern Europe before World War I,
the provisions of the various peace treaties of 1918 which divided these
areas into a large number of small countries actually set the stage for
the exercise of economic power by Germany (12, p. 94). Further, the revival
2
of international trade during the "five good years" o£ 1924*-28 saw a
substantial rise in Germany's share of the foreign trade of the new

cessionary and succession states. During the depression this share fell
in general, so that the rising shares under the New Plan may represent to
a large extent the effects of restoring prosperity to the economies con-
cerned.
While Ellis agrees that the economic effects of the clearing
agreements cannot be separated from the effects of domestic recovery he
does argue on theoretical grounds that they created economic losses
for both Germany and the partner nations. The economic losses were not
from the exercise of monopoly power by Germany, but from the resource mis-
allocation which was the result of Germany's drive to build up a monopoly
position. This process is epitomized, in Ellis' view, by the diversion of
Germany's cotton imports from the United States to Brazil, which previously
had produced very little cotton and almost none for export. This meant
that Germany was receiving cotton trom a high-cost producer while Brazil
was losing the export proceeds which could be obtained from other export
crops (10, p, 252). This argument 1 valid, but only 11 the implicit
economic assumptions of the argument were validated by the economic condi-
tions of the 1930s. These are, at a minimum, that the partner nation be
at full employment (otherwise, the resources Brazil put into cotton pro-
duction would have zero opportunity cost) and that the previous allocation
of resources was optimal. Given the dangers of monoculture for an under-
developed nation and the frequent use of Brazil's reliance upon coffee as
3
an example of these dangers, the latter assumption may be questioned. Cer-
tainly, all countries relying upon the export of primary products for
earning foreign exchange had large reserves of unutilized reserves coming

8out of the depression in 1933. Even as late as 1938, League of Nations
studies found that Latin America was making substantial Increases in the
production of cocoa, tobacco, cotton, wheat, meatpacking, wood products,
fuels and power, metals, and non-metallic minerals. Only in coffee was
the level of production falling from 1936 to 1938.(14, pp. 173-181). On
the German side, reviving trade with lowest cost producers would have
required giving up the advantages of the moratorium on transfer of foreign ex<-
change to service the huge foreign debt of Germany rr the largest of any nation be<
fore the depression. Ellis therefore overstates the real costs both to
Germany and her partner countries of the clearing agreements. Indeed,
the only basis he suggests for using the resource misallocation argument
is the fact that the total volume of Germany's foreign trade recovered to
pre-Depression levels — which could be a tribute to the efficacy of the
New Plan rather than a criticism of its efficiency.
II* The Finances of the New Plan
If Germany did not actual*'? exploit the potential economic advan-
tages of a monopsonist or monopolist position, and if the economic advan-
tages of competitive pricing were foregone with little real cost to either
Germany or Germany's partners, innovative financial arrangements were
required. The key arrangements were but a few ot the welter of innovations
and regulatory interventions made by the German officials responsible for
administering the New Plan. The effectiveness of the financial arrange-
ments is measured by the fact that so many of the other regulations were
designed to oppose their effective operation.
The government regulators of the New Plan probably did not know

what they were doing that waB working bo well In the field of foreign
trade. Officials tried to reduce th.i prices paid on imports and made
constant efforts to improve the terms of trade; fortunately they were
doomed to failure by the maintenance of an overvalued mark which meant
deficits would be incurred with respect to trade with countries where
trading agreements were not in effect. To carry out trade without run-
ning a deficit, it was necessary for German exporters and importers to
make private compensation agreements . German importers needed to find
exporters who could provide them with foreign exchange claims so they could
get permission to import. The exporter's price, due to the overvalued
mark, was x percent over the world price. The importer would pay him
this premium of x percent in marks, the exporter would make the foreign
sale, but sell the foreign exchange gained to the importer. The Import
would be made, the domestic price jacked up by £ percent to recover the
premium, and all private parties to the transactions in Germany and a-
broad, were content without n capital outflow from Germany.
This process was greatly facilitated by the development of ASKI
marks (acronym for Aus lander Sonderkonten fur Inlands zahlung) which would
be received in the first instance by an exporter of goods to Germany (who
charged more than he would have for payment in regular marks). He could
sell these, at a discount, to the importer of goods from Germany who then
used them to pay the German price (11 , pp. 68-70). The mark remained
overvalued, but the ASKI mark effectively floated. This was in effect a
two-tier exchange rate, so highly favored by France and Belgium today,
since Germany made payments on her huge foreign indebtedness in gold marks ,
*
A provision put in Dawes plan by E. W. Kemmerer
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but made payments on merchandise accounts in ASKI marks.
More important for the states of southeastern Europe were the
clearing agreements . Since German exports to these states were expensive
and limited to non-essential goods permitted to leave the country while
German imports from the states were substantial and priced about 30% above
the world price, export surpluses were built up in the partner nations.
In Southeastern Europe, Germany was accumulating large debts amounting to
Rm. 450 million in 1934 and to Rm. 367 million in March 1935 (2, p. 175).
The exporters in the countries of southeastern Europe who had accumulated
these claims tried to sell them in their own countries. In each case it
was necessary for the Central Bank to intervene if the blocked marks
(Sperrmark8) were not to depreciate relative to the gold mark or relative
to the exchange rate fixed upon in the original clearing agreement with
Germany. Bulgaria Was the only country in which the rate remained unchanged
from the original parity; in Hungary a premium was added to the mark for
trade in certain commodities by agreement between the National Banks; in
Roumania the National Bank's initial refusal to support the price of
clearing marks in the open market was overcome by German pressure in future
commercial negotiations; Yugoslavia exercised considerable independence
letting the clearing marks fall to 12.5 dinars when the official rate was
17.5; the Bank of Greece maintained the official rate by steady inter-
vention (7, pp. 176-7). Export surpluses by the countries involved were
being sustained by capital exports to Germany in the blocked accounts. On
the basis of foreign credits held by the Central Bank in the subjugated
country, domestic note Issues could be made. The effects of domestic
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monetary expansion under the depressed conditions prevailing wae upon
employment rather than prices.
The expansionary effects of central bank activities in the part-
ner nations were strongest when tht bank supported the German Sperrmarks
which were earned by its exporters; weakest when the Sperrmarks were allowed
to depreciate. So Hungary and Bulgaria benefited most in economic terms
from the clearing agreements, while politically these two countries were
most favorable to German influence. Roumania and Yugoslavia, on the other
hand, refused to accept the economic benefits possible from increased
German trade, motivated by their lingering hopes tor the success of the
Petite Entente or some regional economic bloc in the Danublan basin which
would exclude Germany (cf. 2^, chs. 9, 17). Indeed, the National Bank of
Roumania was plagued by a Foreign Advisor (French) who recommended as late
as 1935 that 85 of the 115 banks in Bucharest should be eliminated and that
430 out of 924 banks in the provinces should disappeer (25 , p. 109).
Roumania was able to have a substantial budget surplus in 1935-6 while
Bulgaria maintained an expansionary deficit.
The willingness of the central banks in Hungary, Austria, and
Bulgaria to accept the blocked marks in effect as foreign exchange reserves
to be used for note issue can be explained in part by their previous
experience with the gold-exchange standard in the late 1920s. In fact, the
financial arrangements which underlay the success of the clearing agreements
from the viewpoints of both partners can be seen as the culmination of the
interwar experiments with financial reconstruction of the new European
nation states. Experiments which began with the League of Nations supervised
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reconstruction loan to Austria.
Ill • The Historical Background t o Schacht's liaw Pirn
The financial situation of the new nations of .— .tr^i and
eastern Europe was one of the \?orst trouble spots of the world depression
from 1929 to 1933. Indeed, their financial roes were the proxLmite source
of the collapse of che world monetary system which occurred in 1931 after
the failure of the Kredltanstalt . Their situation can be analysed very
simply — failing world prices for their main expert commodities enabled
them to earn less foreign exchange to pay the service charges on the: :
foreign debt which were fixnd in nominal teras. Cable II repr? faces tha
pertinent information fro"., the report of ths League of Nations Stresa
Conference dealing with the problem.
Table II, The Transfer Probata of Central an-.; 1 -ietern European Kn i Lc- Btefra**
Country Year Trade surplus (+) Total foreign Foreign debt
or deficit (-) debt (1932) tervJ.ee charg
(All figures in millions of Swiaa franc3 («*$0.19 on old parity)
110}
llCf pub 11-: debt
13f only
2,432 214 all foreign t
(moratorium on June 23, 1952)
177
248
3,774 -— (moratorium)
ustria 1929 -782
1930 -622
1931 -622
Jan. -June 193?. !
ungary 1929 -23
19 30 +30
1931 +16
Jan. -June 1932 -It-
(Table cont'd.)
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Table II. (cont'd.)
Country Year Trade surplus (+)
or deficit (-)
Total Foreign
debt (1932)
Foreign debt
service charges
Bulgaria
Jan. -June
1929
1930
1931
1932
-69
+60
+47
-9 715
24
31
30
15 (15 in morate
Czechoslo-
vakia
Jan. -June
1929
1930
1931
1932
+78
+276
+213
-36 2,037
51
86
70
52
Poland
Jan. -June
1929
1930
1931
1932
-176
+108
+242
+62 4,457
113
145
152
NA
Romania
Jan. -June
1929
1930
1931
1932
-14
+170
+192
+63 5,266
165) public debt
172? only
19V
Yugoslavia
Jan. -June
1929
1930 •
1931
1932
+25
-15
+6 3,269 116
Source: Le ejue of Nations
storation of Ce
, Report I r the Stresa Conference for the Economic
Re ntral and Eastern Europe (Geneva, 1932), Annex 3.
By the time of the Stresa Conference, those countries benefiting
from League supervision in the early twenties had suspended transfer pay-
ments on short term credits and long term loans, and had instituted exchange
controls through their central banks. These banks had been closely tied
to the Bank of England, which was now off the gold standard. The members
of the Petite Entente had not suspended payments on foreign debt although
exchange controls were being introduced with respect to the currencies of
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the succession states, as a defensive measure. Their central banks were
more closely affiliated with the Bank of France, still on the gold standard.
Oddly enough, the export surpluses of the Petite Entente and Poland [also
on the gold standard] continued Into the first years of the world depres-
sion, In each case because falling exports were offset by falling Imports.
It appears from closer analysis that the decline In Imports was achieved
mostly at the expense of neighboring states, by reducing the Imports of
foodstuffs and raw materials (2_, pp. 37-40). Hungary, with the largest
debt service, would normally be expected to have the largest expert surplus
but It was hurt first by a commercial war with Czechoslovakia starting in
1930 and then by a restriction of agricultural imports Ly Germany.
By 1931, the service of the external debt ranged from 16% of
total exports in Bulgaria to 48% in Hungary. (Czechoslovakia, the most
industrialized country of the region with relatively little ext rnal debt
compared to internal debt had only 5% of its exports accounted for by
debt service) (15 , p. 7). Here was the classic dilemma confrouting the
Bank of France in its allegiance to the Gold Stanuird — attaining full
partnership in the key currency club mean*- undermining the debt: service
mechanism used to exercise political control in the debtor countries. In-
deed, by 1929 it was becoming apparent in the felicitous phrase of the
League's World Economic Survey, 1931/32 "Capital was flowing uphill from
the debtor to the creditor countries" (p. 177). With this revise flow of
capital, the means of political control were being eroded as private
investors sought their own economic interests.
Why had France undermined the debt service mechanise in the new
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states by l*.s return to the gold standard? A major part of the explanation
is illustrated In Table III.
Table III. Distribution of World Gold Stocks 192* -34
(millions of dollars)
Country 1924 1925 1976 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934
United States 4090 3985 4083 3977 3746 3900 4225 4051 4045 4865 '5980
England 748 695 729 737 748 710 718 588 583 928 973
Prance 710 711 711 954 1253 1633 2100 2699 3254 3022 3216
Germany 181 288 436 444 650 544 528 234 192 92 19
Italy 221 222 224 242 266 273 279 296 307 373 306
Total 8956 8974 9210 9568 10028 10306 10917 11291 11897 11942 12858
Source: Charles 0. Hardy, Is There Enough Gold ? (Washington, D. C:
Brookings 1936), pp. 92-93.
From holding 8 percent of the world's monetary stock in 1924-1926,
France increased its holding*; to 19 percent under the regime of Emile Moreau
and topped out at 27 percent under Clement Moret in 1932. It was argued by
the Geld Delegation (greatly encouraged by Norman) that this scramble for
fold by the major gold exchange stai lard countries had caused an excess
demand for gold, given the naads and abilities of the United States and Great
Britain to maintain tl~ sir stocks. The counterpart of this excess demand
for gold was, of course, ^n excess supply of goods offered in international
trade. Given the effectiveness of American and British techniques for
sterilizing gold stocks, compensating gold flows did not occur. Given
stabilized currencies (42 countries were on the gold exchange standard at
the end of 1928), there was no nominal price adjustment in the gold market.
The full price effect of the international disequilibrium came in the
commodity markets. Prices there began to tumble in 1928 and the pent-up
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deflation of the mid-twenties (staved off by producers' cartels and inter-
nal price support programs) dropped prices very rapidly as the financing of
various price support schemes collapsed. This, in turn, meant a reduction
in the nominal export earnings of the exporters of primary goods while their
foreign debt service remained fixed.
The chief architect of France's return to the gold standard was
Emile Moreau, appointed Governor of the Bank of France on June 24, 1926.
It was the peculiar circumstances of the stabilization of the "franc Poincare"
combined with the personal animosity of Moreau and Montagu Norman, Governor
of the Bank of England, that led directly to the collapse of the gold ex-
change standard in 1931. The outcome of Moreau' 8 resolve to return to a
fixed exchange rate combined with the fact that the rate determined on was
10 percent below the current purchasing power parity, gave the Bank of France
Immense holdings of sterling claims even by Spring 1927. Moreau began to put
pressure upon the Bank of England by asking for gold in exchange for some of
his sterling holdings. His nominal excuse was that this was necessary in
order to cut off credit in the London money market for speculators on the
French franc anticipating that the final rate would be at the purchasing
power parity.
In addition to this limited goal (which could have been done more
quickly and more effectively by domestic measures Moreau was fully capable of
implementing himself), Moreau wished to establish himself as a full and equal
partner in the "Central Bankers Club" along with Norman, Strong, and Schacht.
And, as he wrote, "in a more general way, try to adjust French and English
interests on the question of interallied debts and the working of the Dawes
Plan with a promise to examine together European monetary questions." (20 ,
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p, 324). Prior to his historic con rrontation with Norman on May 27, 1927,
(see below) Moreau had explained to Polncare to what purposes he intended
to exercise his power over the Bank of England.
"I propose to profit from our situation which is tem-
porarily very strong, by concluding an agreement with
the Bank of England to defend our respective currencies
against speculation. M. Polncare counseled prudence
because the financial situation of England had deterior-
ated badly for some time... I continued my statement by
telling the President that we could try to get support
from Norman in Europe, notably for the issue of the
Dawes securities. M. Polncare replied that he doesn't
want for the moment more than a partial placement of the
obligation, because we would have to evacuate the
Rhineland if the total issue was placed... On the other
hand, he counsels me to work at gaining major influence
among the Petitie Entente, which through hatred of
England and fear of Germany, are now entirely with us."
(20, pp. 319-20).
Finally, Polncare instructed Moreau to do nothing to offend the United
States'.
Moreau made every effort to carry out Polncare ' s political in-
structions while discomforting Norman and his chief aides in whom he found
"no frankness, but a hypocritical attitude, based on malevolence but
tempered fortunately by fear." (Moreau, p. 545). His chief work with
respect to East Central Europe was the stabilization of the Roumanian leu ,
which he sought to carry out independently of the League of Nations and of
Norman. ("M. Quesnay asks us if we have the intention of keeping Norman
outside the consortium. Naturally yes." (20
, p. 496)) To do this, he
sent experts from the Bank of France to the Bank of Roumania to study the
situation at first hand and to draw up a plan of stabilization to be sub-
mitted in the first instance to Benjamin Strong for his approval. The plan
had to observe the League's principles, however, to be acceptable to Strong.
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Moreau explained to M. Kiriacesco, Governor of the Bank of Roumania, that
"concessions on the part of the Bank of Roumania will be, on the other hand,
necessary to strengthen the independence of the Bank vis-a-vis political
parties and to assure foreign control over the Bank ." (italics added)
(20, p. 510).
Fortunately for Moreau 1 s case with Strong, Norman had not gone to
the Financial Commission for one of his most important stabilizations, that
of Italy* s lira in 1927. Moreover, neither the Bank of France nor any other
European central bank was asked to participate in the negotiations, only in
the loan. Similarly, the stabilization of the Belgian belga and the Polish
zloty had taken place by going to Strong directly without going through
the League* s Financial Commission. These precedents helped Moreau justify
it
to Strong his circumvention of the League and Norman.
Norman had begun his efforts at reconstruction loans and currency
stabilization in Austria in 1922. His attention was drawn quite naturally
to Austria ihrough the difficulties of two Austrian beaks, the Anglo-Austrian
and the Laender Bank. In 1914, at the outbreak of hostilities, the Bank of
ft
Moreau carried his case to Strong so effectively that on March 23, 1928
Strong felt compelled to send a cable to Lubbock, Deputy Governor of the
Bank of England, with a copy to Moreau, which concluded, "We now see no
logical or consistent reason for our declining to so recommend (participa-
tion by other central banks) and at the same time we see definite advantages
for harmonious cooperation by our extending to the Bank of France exactly
the same support for a plan under their leadership that they and other Banks
of Issue have given under the leadership of other central banks." (Chandler,
p. 412). The same day, Strong sent another telegram to Lubbock (without a
copy to Moreau) which concluded, "We wish to be certain that you and Norman
realize (a) that we are not a bit embarrassed (b) that we are rooting for
a central bank cooperation and (c) that we still love you." (6, p. 413).
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England had accepted liability for acceptances by the London offices of
these two banks, among many other foreign and colonial banks. The postwar
difficulties of these two banks were due in large part to the loss of their
branches, especially those in Czechoslovakia, with the break-up of the
Austrian Empire. Since French capital was also interested in the Laender
Bank, Norman focused on the Anglo-Austrian. It was decided after investiga-
tion of the bank's affairs that it should be reorganized as an English bank.
The bank of England would give it a loan of working capital, accepting de-
ferred stock in place of the 1914 acceptances. Even with this reorganiza-
tion and infusion of fresh capital, the Anglo-Austrian could not be expected
to resume business profitably unless it could have its war-time assets and
pre-war assets released in some manner to provide security for new credits.
The Austro-Hunsarian Bank, the pre-war central bank it would normally turn
to for support, was not functioning. The French and Italians had reparation
claims, the Americans had relief credit claims, and no agreement could be
reached on their proper adjudicatic 1. (J3, ch. 4).
Montagu Norman worked successfully to have the Financial Committee
of the League of Nations, dominated by Englishmen — Sir Henry Strakosch,
Sir Otto Niemeyer, and Sir (later Lord) Arthur Salter — become the interna-
tional agency needed. The Financial Committee became the organizing center
of the entire program of reconstruction required in East Central Europe.
Norman's use of the Financial Commission to handle the political problems
of reconstruction combined with his use of the Bank of England to handle
the international financial problems of reorganization of Austria's domestic
finances set thepattern of his participation.
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The reconstruction of Austria carried out by tha Financial Commis-
sion followed courses of action recommended first in the Brussels Interna-
tional Financial Conference of 1920 and the Genoa Conference of 1922. The
Brussels Conference recommended that loans be made to the countries with
deteriorating exchange rates by countries having favorable exchange move-
ments and trade balances, but that this credit should be limited to the mini-
mum necessary, and secured by the best collateral obtainable in the borrower
country. These loans should have first priority above all other indebtedness
(including reparations claims by the French, and claims on relief credit by
the Americans) and special security should be put aside. In the case of
Germany and the new States, it was explicitly suggested that the special
security be the gross charges on imports and exports. In these countries,
the rapid rates of domestic inflation, the even more rapid deterioration of
their foreign exchange rates meant that indirect taxes, and especially customs
duties, had greatly increased in relative importance as sources of revenue
for the Staie (League of Nations, I temational Financial Conference at
Brussels , Geneva,, 1920) *
The Genoa Proposals recommended that new banks of issue be estab-
lished with constitutional guarantees of their independence from the State
as well as provincial and local governments. In addition, it was recommended
that these new banks of issue use foreign currency or commercial bills denomi-
nated in foreign currency as a substitute for gold or silver backing of their
note issue — a gold exchange standard with, it was anticipated, sterling
restored as the key currency. All these proposals and the actions of the
Financial Commission based upon them appeared as sound, enlightened financial
policy to Norman and to the international banking fraternity which he was now
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trying to organize into some kind of cohesive, forceful group.
[Norman] recognized that reparations, debts and reconstruct
tion were all political questions, and that he in his field
could do nothing until government, directly or through the
League, had removed the political complications in the way;
but this condition satisfied, they were all economic ques-
tions and should be treated ae such, the marketability of
a loan, on which he had to pronounce, being the test of re-
spect for economic considerations* ...The dependence in
the last resort of the succession of schemes on the issue
of loans for voluntary subscription in the world's markets
was an advantage; it compelled the submission of every
scheme to the hard test of the market. (£, pp. 191-93).
Quite a different interpretation of the gold exchange standard
roles of the Financial Commission and of the Bank of England in east and
central Europe were given by Emile Moreau. Describing the reconstruction
schemes of the English to Raymond Poincare in February 1928, Moreau explained
that,
"England, having been the first European country to reestab-
lish a stable and secure money after the war 5 has ueed that
advantage to establish a basis for putting Europe under a
veritable financial domination. The financial committee at
Gineva has been the instrument of that policy. The method
consists of forcing every country in monetary difficulty to
subject itself to the Cormittee at Generva, which the British
control. The remedies prescribed always involve the instal-
ling in the central bank of a foreign supervisor T/?ho is British
or designated by the Bank of England, and the deposit of part
of the gold stock of the Bank of Issue at the Sank of England,
which serves both to support the pound and to strengthen
British influence. To guarantee against possible failure
they are careful to secure the cooperation of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York. In addition, they pass on to
America the task of making some of the foreign loans if they
seem too heavy, always retaining the political advantages of
these operations.
England is thus completely or partly entrenched i .. Austria,
Hungary, Belgium, Norway and Italy. She is entrenching herself
in Greece and Portugal. She is searching for a foothold in
Yugoslavia and she is craftily fighting us in Roumania. Are we
going to let this continue"? (20, p. 438).
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The evidence on the actual operation of the reconstruction projects of
the League in Austria and Hungary confirms Moreau' s evaluation rather
than Clay's. This may not be too surprising since Moreau was basing his
interpretation upon long conversations with one of his chief aides, Pierre
Quesnay, who had worked for four years on the Austrian reconstruction for
the League. Barely three weeks after he became Governor of the Bank of
France in 1926, Moreau learned of the "secret intentions of the governor
of the Bank of England; M. Montagu Norman would seem to have imperialist
designs upon all the European central banks." (20, p. 24). Later, Moreau
sent Quesnay to visit the Bank of England to learn the mechanics of Norman's
"imperialism." Evidence of Norman's domineering begins with the act of appoint-
ing the President of the Austrian National Bank. In spite of making the new
central bank formally independent of the government, somehow the Geneva agree-
ments had left it up to the Austrian government to decide who should be the
President of the Bank. A. R. Zimmerman, the Commissioner-General for the League,
strongly recommended to Rudolf Seipel, President of Austria, that he appoint a
foreigner to the position, one who knew the money markets abroad and who would
inspire confidence among overseas investors. Instead, Seipel and the
Austrian Parliament, amid a great deal of public discussion, appointed an
Austrian — Dr. A. J. Reisch. As a gesture to Zimmerman, who after all had
first claim on all customs receipts and the revenue of the tobacco monopoly,
the two largest sources of government revenue, Seipel proposed appointing
a Foreign Adviser to the Bank and nominated the Chairman of the League's
Financial Committee, M. Albert Janssen, a director of the Bank of Belgium.
After several months, during which the office of Foreign Adviser was formally
written into the Bank's charter, a Swiss banker, M. Schnyder von Wartensee,

took the post.
All this was being done on the basis that otherwise foreign in-
vestors necessary for the success of the reconstruction loans would be wary
of the Austrian de.it issue. Two loans were required, one a short term loan
totaling fc3, 500,000 to finance the needs of the Austrian government while
it began reforms, not the least of which was to reduce employees by 100,000
over a period of two years, the other a long term loan which could be used
to secure credits at the central bank. Five governments guaranteed the
first loan — equal parts by England, France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia,
and a nominal 2.0% by Belgium. Over half the loan was actually raised,
however, in London, with Paris raising only one-seventh, and Switzerland,
Brussels, and Stockholm proportionately less. Five months later, the
long term loan was floated after much careful preparation. Again, the
lion' 8 share was raised in London — $51,660,000 — but this time New York
was allowed to participate with the next largest share — $22,500,000.
The total raised in these two final, .ial centers plus Paris, Rome, Vienna,
and Prague was a bit under $125 million. The loan was described in League
documents as very successful. The meager U.S. share was oversubscribed
several times within fifteen minutes of its issue, the London share three
times over in two hours, and rapid oversubscription also took place in
Amsterdam and Stockholm. Either Norman had done his work very well, or
perhaps he had over-represented the reluctance of investors to purchase
Austrian debt when it was so well guaranteed by League control over the
country* s finances. In his monthly Commissioner's Report, Zimmerman
commented, "Such an occurrence [the rapid subscriptions] had never been
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contemplated. It is evident that t'e Austrian Stat a' r credits, strengthened
as it was by the Geneva protocols, had actually been underestimated."
(Sixth Report
, p. 4).
In the case of Hungary, Norman felt stronger measures had to be
taken. He blocked the first League scheme for Hungary because it provided
for the payment of reparations charges required under the Treaty of Trianon.
The office of Foreign Adviser was written into the charter of the Hungarian
National Bank from the beginning and the Adviser was given right of suspen-
sive veto of actions of the Bank until he could consult with the CommisDionsr-
General and the Financial Commission of the League. Not only the customs
and the tobacco monopoly were to be taken as security of the reconstruction
loan, but also the net proceeds of the salt monopoly and the sugar tax.
Without waiting for guarantees to be put up by Allied governments, the Bank
of England made a large loan directly to the Hungarian National Bank. Later s
the Interest on this loan as well as the interest on the Bank of England's
holding of t'.ie Austrian loan were rt dtted to the Hungarian and Austrian
banks to finance their pension plans for employees (8, p. 69). The period
of negotiations was sped up and possibilities of political interference from
the French reduced by eliminating government guarantees altogether. Again,
the results of these preparations made to calm the nervous fears of timid
overseas investors proved very satisfying with rapid subscription of the
separate issues save strangely enough, the London issue where the Bank of
England finally had to step in and take half the fe8 million issue itself.
At the end of July the price of the Hungarian bonds fell sharply in London
on the basis of a rumor, apparently false, that the Americans could not
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place the p^rt of the Hungarian tranche which they had assumed (2T.Y. Tires
,
July 26, 1924). It is not odd that London, with the largest issues of these
loans, should begin having difficulties with them. It io odd 9 however,
that Norman would continue retaining the largest shares for London unless
Moreau's interpretation of his Motives is correct.
How successful was Kbrman's version of the gold exchange standard
in establishing English influence in the Continent? One critarion would be
to see how his efforts at central bank cooperation with respect to the new
States kept them on a gold--exchange standard without having them try to go
to a full gold standard. Clearly the purpose of Norman's policies from the
viewpoint of gold standard enthusiasts (which includes all central bankers
then and most today) was to economize on the use of gold in making interna-
tional settlements. The problem was severe after World War I because of * *..j
large sum3 of foreign indebtedness and of reparation claims on the one hand
and the virtual sterilization of the major portion oZ th«2 world's gold stock
by the United States, on the other. Judged in terms cf this goal, Norman
was brilliantly successful, at lea3t up to the point when Great Britain had
to go off the gold standard herself. Examining the reserves of the countrioii
where Moreau felt that England had entrenched herself or was ir. the process
of entrenching herself, we find that in 1927 and 1928 the percentages of
their total international reserves which were foreign exchange holdings was
quite high, both with regard to pre-war holdings and with recpect to the norm
of 43-48% which seemed to be established for all gold exchance standard coun-
tries in the period 1925-30. (£, p. 744). Even later, when the percentages
begin to decline, the reason in each case is because total international
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Table IV. Foreign exchange as percentage of total foreign exchange plus
monetary gold holdings in East Central European central banks.
1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 (Sept.)
Austria 97.8 97,4 92.3 88.5 78.8 77.2 77.0 40.3 21.0
Hungary 83.1 85.5 59.5 51.4 31.8 32.7 29.3 18.6 10.2
Bulgaria 48.1 31.7 36.2 46.7 67.5 45.3 35.7 14.9 9.5
Greece 74.4 70.0 70.5 69.7 87.0 79.5 83.2 55.0 40.3
Belgium 9.9 9.9 41.9 42.2 38.5 32.9 41.4 37.9 —
Italy 7.9 20.6 34.2 62.5 54.4 49.8 44.9 27.8 19.5
Source: W.A. Brown, The International Gold Standard Reinterpreted , 1914-1934
New York: NBER, 1940, v. II, p. 742-3.
assets of the gold exchange countries were declining a® international trade
declined and they settled their deficits inforeign exchange holdings in
preference to giving up monetary gold.
Another criterion might be to see how English trade was increased
witb these countries where Norman was exercising hie central bank imperial-
ism. According to the records on trade compiled by the League of Nations,
the U.K. "s percentage of total imports into Austria was actually lower
by half during the mid<~1920*s than t was in 1913 (whei it was only 6.4%),
for Hungary it rose slightly reaching the unimpressive total of 3,3% in
1927, and the highest percentage of trade among the Danubian star.es for the
British was reached in Yugoslavia — 10.6% in 1924. The striking thing
which appears among the Danubian states in the prosperous period from 1924
through 1928 is the steady rise in the relative importance of Germany toward
its pre-war eminence in the foreign trade of the region. (16) « Norman*
s
grand scheme was successful viewed from' the Germano-phobic perspective of
Moreau, but it depended upon a rising share of British exports in the
German market to make it effective from the British point of view. This
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weak link in the chain of British influence over central and eastern Europe
was preventing political successes for Britain from following Norman's
economic successes.
IV. Conclusion
In the international monetary history of the interwar period, the
conflict between the goals of foreign economic policy and of foreign politi-
cal policy are best explored in the context of "central bank cooperation."
This paper has focused upon the policies of the central bankers of the major
powers with respect to the nascent nation states synthesized by the Paris
peace treaties from the dismembered Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian
empires. These new nation-states formed the interwar analogue to the new
nation-states created after World War II from the dismantled British and
French overseas empires. Their monetary history is especially interesting
since it shows that international economic cooperation among the major
countries is not only hindered by conflicts of domestic economic policy but
also by competing foreign policy ai ,s. It was these conflicts in the sphere
of foreign policy which laid the basis for the failure of the gold-exchange
standard based on the United States dollar and tha United Kingdom pound
sterling. The French technique for restoring the gold standard proved to
be unviable on economic grounds; the British technique unviable on political
grounds
.
While all this is relatively well-known and accepted, it has gen-
erally been overlooked that one major country did find a way to reconcile
successfully its domestic economic policies with its foreign political
goals, especially with respect to the new nation states of central and
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southern Europe.* And it has been forgotten that this reconciliation was
accomplished while expanding the international trade and division of labor
which are the goals of international economic cooperation. The reason
this highly instructive historical experience has been ignored is because
the country was Hitler's Germany, operating under the New Plan of Hjalmar
Schacht, and it has implicitly been assumed that Schacht 's New Plan is
linked as Inextricably in its economic logic with Hitler's megalomaniac
Impulses as it was in historical fact. In fact, the economic logic of
Schacht' 8 innovation was much more closely linked with "central bank
cooperation" than with Hitler's war preparations, which were costly, risky,
and promised no more economic benefits than the Neuplan was already genera-
ting for Germany.
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The author gratefully acknowledges the careful reading and
helpful comments made by Professor Donald L. Kemmerer, University of
Illinois, anu Professors Ren£ Allttao. .t, and Lawrence Wtiser, University
of Wisconsin-Stevens Point.
1949.
2
W. A. Lewis* phrase in Economic Survey,, 1919-1939. London,
3
In 1963-5, Brazil wae the fifth largest producer of cotton lint,
accounting for six percent of world production, more than either Mexico or
Egypt. Further, it consumed one-half of this in domestic production of yarn.
[Oxford Economic Atlas, 4th edn., 1972, p. 32.]
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